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Cypriots quenching their thirst with the water brought in from Turkey via the
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Cyprus ‘peace water’ project: how it could affect Greek-Turkish
relations on the island
A water pipeline between Turkey and northern Cyprus was recently completed, despite criticism from
some Greek Cypriot politicians that the project would increase Turkey’s influence over the north of the
island. Rebecca Bryant writes that the project represents part of Turkey’s long-term strategy to
increase development in the north, preparing it for an agreement to end the division of the island, but
also making it prepared to stand on its own. She argues that Greek Cypriots nevertheless carry some
of the blame for Turkey’s growing influence over northern Cyprus and that they should focus on
developing new and urgent policies regarding the north rather than delaying engagement until after a
solution is reached.
On 17 October, on a bluff overlooking the north Cyprus shore, supporters of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
Turkish Cypriot nationalists, and the simply curious gathered to watch Turkish and Turkish Cypriot leaders inaugurate
the ‘project of the century.’ As women who had waited too long for Erdoğan’s arrival began to faint from the heat,
leaders gave speeches and opened a pump, as they had done only a couple of hours earlier in the Turkish city of
Anamur. This was ceremonial, however, since water was already gushing, making its way across 66.5 kilometres of
sea and filling a dam in north Cyprus the size of a small city.
When Erdoğan first announced the plan more than four
years ago, Turkish Cypriots looked on it sceptically.
Since the 1950s, Cypriots have dreamed of bringing
water from Turkey, whose Taurus Mountains in the
south feed rivers that flow into the sea. Following the
Greek-backed coup and subsequent Turkish military
intervention that divided the island in 1974, Turkish
Cypriots began again to discuss bringing water from
the country that in those days they still considered their
‘motherland’. But in a classic case of crying wolf,
Turkish Cypriots had imagined the water for so long,
and had been so often disappointed, that it took them
some time to understand that when Erdoğan says a
project will happen, apparently it has to happen.
This unprecedented project began in Turkey, where
two villages were displaced to construct the dam that
would be the source. Suspended pipes were strung
over the course of more than two years, often against
strong waves and currents. The countryside and many of the roads in north Cyprus have been torn apart to lay the
total of 478 kilometres of pipes that will deliver the water throughout the island. It is expected that the pipes will deliver
75 million cubic metres of water every year for approximately the next fifty years. Half of this water will be for domestic
and industrial use, half for agricultural use.
Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akıncı declared during the inauguration that the water would make Cyprus the Green
Island again, referring to its name in medieval literature. Other Turkish Cypriot politicians claimed that it would change
the parameters of ongoing negotiations to reunify the island. Still others proclaimed this one-of-a-kind engineering feat
as a proof of the greatness of the Turkish nation.
All the leaders called it ‘peace water’, referring to Turkish claims that it may become a liquid inducement for Greek
Cypriots to negotiate a settlement to reunify the divided island. In the island’s south, however, right-wing Greek Cypriot
politicians fumed, characterising the project as ‘a third invasion’, while the Republic of Cyprus foreign ministry claimed
that it would ‘augment Turkey’s influence and control over Cyprus’.
This claim is certainly true, and it has been a source of disagreement between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, the latter
of whom have considerably mixed feelings about this generosity. On the one hand, water is a critical concern, as the
average rainfall for the island as a whole is only 480 millimetres. In the north, misuse, especially as a result of tourism
and a boom in holiday home construction for foreigners, has dried up certain aquifers and left parts of the central plain
with trickling water supplies that have a distinctly salty taste.
There is no water conservation programme in the north, where water is normally supplied to homes only every few
days but everyone has water tanks to collect it. Water delivery services drain wells in an unregulated way.
Environmental groups charge that the key to solving the water problem is not flooding Cyprus with water from across
the sea but rather with devising local solutions. There are also concerns about the project’s potential effects on the
sea as a whole – a question that has been insufficiently studied.
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Turkish Cypriots, however, have been especially vocal about the project’s management. While Turkish Cypriots argue
that the project was part of Turkey’s aid package to north Cyprus and should be used both for their benefit and profit,
Turkish leaders are reluctant to put a project on which they spent 1.6 billion Turkish lira (approximately £358 million)
into the hands of the municipalities and local water authority, as Turkish Cypriots are asking. Turkish Cypriots not only
want to reap the financial benefits of the water but also do not want to have their autonomy impinged upon by the
potential threat of cutting it off.
And here we come to the crux of the matter. Although north Cyprus is often portrayed as a province or colony of
Turkey, until the arrival of the AK Party Turkish Cypriots actually had considerably more autonomy than they do now.
Former Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Raif Denktaş was highly respected in Turkey and close to the Turkish military, and
he could normally manipulate the latter to get his way.
After the AK Party came to power in late 2002 with a platform of Europeanisation in Turkey and, as a consequence, a
solution in Cyprus, Denktaş and his military cronies were all sidelined. The checkpoints dividing the island opened in
2003, allowing Cypriots to move around the island for the first time in almost three decades, and in 2004, Cypriots
voted in a referendum on a United Nations plan that would have reunited the island. They went to the polls only one
week before the Republic of Cyprus would accede as an EU member state.
Although Turkish Cypriots supported that plan, Greek Cypriots resoundingly rejected it. While negotiations have
continued in fits and starts since then, the Republic of Cyprus has continued a policy of isolating the north, impeding
the various kinds of ‘openings’ that Turkish Cypriots had expected as a result of the referendum. In Greek Cypriot
discourse, cooperation with any institution in the north, including its academic institutions, constitutes ‘recognition by
implication’, meaning that although doors opened in the island, these were not doors that connected Turkish Cypriots
to the world.
Instead, middle-class Turkish Cypriots saw the lives of their Greek Cypriot counterparts and asked why they could not
have the same. And not long after the U.N. plan’s defeat, Turkish politicians began to formulate a Plan B regarding
Cyprus: Making it as strong an entity as possible. Of course, having an economically strong north Cyprus is important
for any eventual reunification, as one of the main reasons Greek Cypriots voted against it in 2004 was that the poorer
north would be a financial burden to them.
However, the Republic of Cyprus also does everything it can to impede that development, leaving Turkish Cypriots
stuck: If they cannot develop in advance of a solution, how can they keep from being either swallowed by the Greek
Cypriot majority or a financial burden to them? And if the Greek Cypriot leadership blocks that development at every
turn, what choice do they have but to develop via Turkey?
In the past ten years, Turkey is a growing regional economic giant that is leaving its imprint more and more on the
island’s north in the name of ‘development’. Global chains have arrived in the island via Turkey, while large, five-star
resorts with Turkish owners now fill its coasts. Turkish Airlines now flies to hundreds of locations, and the
unrecognised Ercan airport connects Cypriots to them through a short commuter flight to Istanbul.
The water project, then, is only the culmination of a longer-term plan to ‘develop’ the north, preparing it for a solution
but also making it prepared to stand on its own. This is the Plan B: Making north Cyprus into a stronger entity so that,
in the event negotiations fail yet again, the Turkish side can argue for its recognition. All of this happens, however, in a
‘Turkish’ way, while the water project is interpreted by many Turkish Cypriots as tying them ‘from the belly’ to Turkey,
like an umbilical cord ties a child to its mother.
The water project is now a fact, though an untested one. The rush to complete it casts some doubt on its construction.
However, if Greek Cypriot politicians are to complain that this cements Turkish occupation, they should also
understand their own complicity. The effect of the ‘recognition by implication’ rhetoric has been like squeezing a
balloon: The air is going to gather somewhere else. If Greek Cypriot leaders are serious about stopping further
Turkish intervention, there need to be new and urgent policies regarding the north that do not delay all engagement
until after a solution that until now has proven elusive.
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